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FOREWORD
This report describes the rationale, objectives, procedures, and results
of the airworthiness assurance process for fault-tolerant aspects of a
quadruplex digital flight control system. Conducted as the basic task
under NAS2-I1853, the effort focused on critical pitch-axis functions for
a relaxed static stability transport. Variations in redundancy management
schemes were examined analytically, and considerable simulator testing
was performed for the baseline system at the Reconfigurable Digital
Flight Control System (RDFCS) Simulator at NASA Ames Research Center.
The intent of this project was to explore system architectures and
associated assurance issues for critical functions such as stability
aug_entation accommodating negative static margins and fly-by-wire
pri_ary flight control. An integrated assurance approach that closely
couples testing with analysis was employed, in a manner exemplifying key
aspects of compliance with FAA Advisory Circular 25.1309-01. Both the
investigations and this report were developed with the view toward its
use for tutorial purposes.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A double fail-operational digital flight control system (DFCS) as shown
in Figure E-I was designed, analyzed, implemented, and validated relative
to system fault tolerance and a subset of pitch-axis control functions.
The system-level fault tolerance design, which from the outset was
constrained by the Reconfigurable Digital Flight Control System (RDFCS)
configuration at NASA Ames (Reference I), was verified using a
predicate/transition network simulation tool developed by the Lockheed-
Georgia Company (Reference 2). The Ada (tm) programming language was
used for software design, but the actual demonstration flight software
was rendered in AED (Algol Extended for Design) as necessary for use in
the RDFCS.
The demonstration at NASA Ames involved modifications to the original
DFCS and system simulator as portrayed in Figure E-2. Basically, the
dual-dual architecture was transformed into a quadruplex architecture
through strictly software changes to extend fault tolerance for full-time
flight criticality. Although the resultant implementation was sub-optimal
from a real-time standpoint, it did realize the verified design. This
served to illustrate the propagation and confirmation of consistency
throughout the development process and to permit the demonstration of new
real-time validation testing methods.
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Figure E-I. Quadruplex DFCS Architect_Ire
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In all, the simulator modifications or enhancementswere considerab]e. It
was necessary to alter software in the PDP-II/60 to ad,] relaxed static
stability flight cases and new sensor signal outputs, and to add a real-
time execution monitor. The new sensor signals in turn ca_]ed for changes
to the modular digital interface conversion unit (MDICU)program. Flight
software states used by the monitor were obtained through the addition of
instrumentation software in the PDP-II/04. Since the PDP-II/04
instrumentation response was insufficient for somepu_:poses,one real-
time execution monitor was programmedin one of the four flight computer
channels to monitor the other three processors.
Finally, correspondence was established between design verification
simulation of the fault-tolerant architecture design and zeal-time system
results of the quadruplex DFCS. Essentially the sam,_ test cases and
instrumentation parameters were used in both cases. Observability was
superior in the case of the design verification simulat'on, for in some
cases, implementation aspects increased the instrumen::<ation task. The
latter proved quite worthwhile in providing more confidence by confirming
the executional correctness of low-level mechanization deuails.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
With the advent of full-time critical control functions, such as
augmented fly-by-wire (AFBW) primary flight control systems, considerably
more effort must be directed toward ensuring and confirming their safety
than would be necessary for flight-phase critical functions such as
autoland. As illustrated in this report, such effort involves the
definition of fault-tolerant system architectures and the application of
a suite of assurance tools to confirm system airworthiness. Since
virtually all flight control systems are now implemented digitally, means
must be employed to cope with greater inherent complexity than present in
comparable analog mechanizations. The addition of fault tolerance
mechanisms for achieving adequate system reliability, moreover, compounds
this complexity problem.
At a system architecture level, the fault-tolerant system differences
between analog and digital mechanization are only beginning to be very
notable. But to attain adequate confidence levels in system
airworthiness, lower levels of digital mechanization must be examined.
This is where assurance methods and tools are essential. Much of the
focus of much of this report, then, is directed toward the dependable
attainment of the higher assurance levels stipulated in the FAA Advisory
Circular 25.1309-1 (Reference 5). The approach taken here is the use of
an integrated assurance methodology wherein the tools and methods are
mutually reinforcing. Such an approach has previously been demonstrated
at the system level (Reference 6).
Unfortunately, the requisite assurance methods, with very appreciable
demands placed on them, have yet to be fully developed and cooperatively
demonstrated. Overall, assurance levels of i0 exp -9 or less
unreliability remain to be convincingly demonstrated in typical practice.
This investigation offers some promising approaches to such concerns by
way of an assurance driven methodology applied from initial design
through real-time system simulation.
i.i Assessment Rationale
Several dimensions of assurance method integration should be acknowledged
in a comprehensive assessment process:
o Reliability, failure effects, and functional performance assessment
methods
o Analysis, test, and inspection types of the above methods
o Mutually supportive incorporation of all of the above _n an
assurance driven system development methodology.
Figure i depicts a central notion in the integrated assurance methodology
used in the subject investigation. Basically, analysis is applied on a
global scale to models or abstractions of the evolving DFCS
configuration. Accordingly, analysis is the dominant assurance approach
during the early stages of development, when only limited descriptions of
the design are available. At that time inspections or walkthroughs are
valuable as well, e.g., a review of the fault conditions applied in
exercising the predicate/transition network simulation. Inspection comes
into play, moreover, any time engineering judgment is exercised in
determining the significance or validity of development process results.
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Figure i. Complementarity of Assurance Methods
Since testing is usually considered to apply only on actual
implementations, it takes place only after the test article has been
mechanized. But the scope of practical test examination is necessarily
limited, so only a small subset of possible test cases can be
investigated. This situation gives rise to the major aspect of the
complementarity of elements of an integrated methodology. Primarily,
testing seeks to examine: the validity of selected analytical results;
facets not amenable to analysis; assumptions underlying analyses; and
operator-in-the-loop performance. Basically, testing is concrete, high
fidelity, and readily convincing, but of it is lacking because of its
inherently limited scope. Judicious test case selection is therefore
vital in maximizing the assurances obtained through testing, but testing
alone cannot provide adequate assurances.
Analysis, on the other hand, is abstract, idealized, and general, but
very dependent upon proper formulation and interpretation. Analysis,
moreover, is essential to effective testing. Various levels of analysis
are involved in maximizing the conclusiveness of testing, as through the
coincident, multilevel testing approach shownin Figure 2. As each stage
of development proceeds, associated analyses yield test case definitions
that can affirm that the ultimate implementation has remained in accord
with prior design decisions. The fact that the various test cases can be
applied coincidentally indicates another dimension of integrated
assurance, one that can greatly extend validation process confidence and
productivity.
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Figure 2. Basis of Multilevel Testing
1.2 Relevance to Other Tasks
This task is closely related to the N-version software fault
tolerance task performed under the same contract (Reference 7).
Basically, the samequadruplex DFCSdesign was used in both: cases. Here,
the executive software was implemented in AED, and syatem redundancy
managementissues were examined in a real-time system sinulator. The N-
version investigation focused mainly on Ada implemented applications
software and its fault tolerance; a non-realtime test harness that
supplanted the executive software was used so that the feur channels of
applications software could be run logically in parallel. Had the
quadruplex DFCSbeen implemented in Ada, it would have been relatively
easy to add the N-version software to it. As it turned out, the
compatibility of the two task products proved useful for tutorial
purposes.
Additionally, the task on analytical sensor redundancy was quite closely
related to the subject one (Reference 8). Specifically, the analytical
redundancy algorithms were added to the quadruplex DFCSsoftware for the
pitch stability augmentation sensors. In summary, these three tasks
addressed computer hardware faults, sensor hardware faults, and DFCS
applications software faults, all within the context and particular
design constraints of the quadruplex DFCSarchitecture in this report.
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2.0 BACKGROUND
There is an appreciable difference between the airworthiness assurances
demandedof a full-time critical function, which is always required for
flight, and a flight-phase critical function, which may experience
very limited use. In particular, a primary flight control system is
absolutely necessary at all times for safe flight, whereas a Category
Ilia autoland is seldom used under actual Category Ilia weather minimums.
While safety of a critical function must be assured in both cases, the
risk in the former instance is far greater because of exposure time and
severe limitations on alternatives. When such functions are mechanized
digitally, there is presently concern over the capacity to ensure DFCS
airworthiness. As a consequence, this investigation has sought to
demonstrate the associated technology and its application in a
representative DFCSdevelopment problem for a pitch-axis AFBW.
2.1 Terminology
In this report, the term ASSURANCETECHNOLOGYis used in a very general
sense to apply to all methods and activities for achieving or confirming
the acceptability of a system. Primary emphasis, moreover, applies to the
property of AIRWORTHINESS,or the assured safety of the system/vehicle.
Those system functions whoseproper operation is in general necessary for
the safe operation of the aircraft are designated as CRITICALper FAAAC
25.1329-01 (Reference I). Functions that can noticeably deteriorate, but
not preclude, the capacity for safe operation of the aircraft, are called
ESSENTIAL.
CERTIFICATIONrefers to the formal process whereby the FAAauthorizes
deployment of an aircraft or system in response to evidence
substantiating that each is indeed airworthy. Desirably, this process is
supported with methods and tools over the development cycle that
facilitate or ensure the conclusiveness of the evidence. The DFCS
development cycle culminates with system VALIDATION,or confirmation that
user requirements have been satisfied. Since these necessarily encompass
system airworthiness, major emphasis in this report is placed on
validating requisite fault survivability.
Of course the assurance process is a cumulative one that endeavors to
attain increasingly convincing evidence of aircraft/system acceptability.
Prior to product validation then, there are a series of VERIFICATION
steps wherein compliance with various levels of specification is
demonstrated. Of particular note here is system design verification,
because as the first critical step in assuring the emerging system, it
establishes the caliber and credibility of the overall assurance process.
In the earlier stages of system development, for example, _'orsiderable
reliance is placed on analysis to confirm acceptability on a global or
general basis. As the system is implemented, greater reliance is placed
on testing particular aspects of the product. But properly, such testing
derives from and reinforces the prior analyses (e.g., see Reference 6).
In summary, note that verification ensures that a system is being
"constructed right," or per specification, and that validatior confirms
that the "right system," or what the user wants, is being cGnstructed(Reference 9).
2.2 FAARegulatory Needs
Prior to the introduction of DFCSs, technical leadership within the FAA
recognized and addressed the attendant challenges in the mid-1970s(Reference i0), as evident by the numberof DFCSscertificated to date.
These have limited function criticality, however, and with the current
prospects for substantial or full-time reliance on critical DFCS
functions, the FAAhas again updated its digital technology agenda (see
Reference Ii). Basically, the FAA perceives a need within its legulatory
staff to becomefamiliarized with the nature and assurance challenges of
the emerging critical systems.
Particular attention has been directed toward stability autmentation
systems (SASs) and fly-by-wire (FBW) systems as soon to appear on
commercial transports. Aside from function criticality per se, the issue
of flying qualities under faults must be confronted regardirg minimum
safety over admissible flight profiles. This opens new areas ¢_f concern
for the FAA, ones that ought to be illustrated on a demonstrator program
of a tutorial nature.
2. 3 General Problem
From the reliability standpoint, the analytical resolution denanded for
critical functions is a problem in itself for digital flight systems, and
the cumulative degradation of flying qualities under multiple faults must
be factored into the analysis. Other related aspects of the problem
include dissimilar redundancy, back-up systems or instrumepts, fault
transients recovery, and pilot workload limits. Interdisciplinary in
nature, the overall problem is new as far as the certification of civil
transports is concerned, so there is a serious and immediate need to
formulate a unified assessment approach.
2.4 System Simulator Role
System simulation with system components, and possibly a pilot, in the
loop is a vital and central part of flight controls practice, both before
and after the advent of digital flight controls. To a lesser extent,
developmental flight simulators have been used as well, especially for
stability or control augmented military vehicles. Some of the work
undertaken on this project is intended to develop and demonstrate better
utilization of system simulation, but owing to the lack of an acceptable
pilot interface in the RDFCSfacility, a full simulator assessment of the
quadruplex DFCScould not be demonstrated. Hence, this report only
undertakes to describe the contributions of the pilot-in-the-loop role of
flight simulators.
In the case of both system and flight simulators, the fidelity provided
by system elements in the real-time loop is especially important in the
case of digital systems because the inherent extra phase lag due to data
holds and transport lags tends to seriously degrade system performance.
Add to this the non-minimum phase characteristics of humanpilots, and
there is a suitable basis for delineating of minimum safe flying
qualities. Since the associated DFCS control law analysis may not
acknowledge these effects, the simulators become especially vital for
digital systems.
Since the newer DFCSs are accompanied by electronic displays and other
cockpit innovations, the pilot-in-the-loop performance has new aspects to
be assessed. For example, the reversion to back-up electromechanical
attitude displays under degraded flying qualities or stressful
operational conditions may well alter what constitutes minimumsafe
flying qualities. Ultimately, such questions may not be difficult to
resolve, but they do remain to be addressed coherently.
2.5 Assurance Technology
A rather broad definition of assurance technology was given in Section
2.2. Here it suffices to note that assurance features can be designed
into a DFCS in a way that greatly facilitates the conduct and
conclusiveness of the assurance process; this is an old theme that is
particularly apt for fault-tolerant systems (see References 12 and 13).
Since the testing reported here is for system validation, especially,
under simulated faults, the overall assessment theme is to illustrate how
accountability is propagated into the validation stage and what this
stage contributes to the process.
2.6 Project Approach
In the interest of focusing the resources available for this task, an
existing quadruplex pitch axis DFCS installed in the RDFCSfacility was
used as a test article. Developed under a Lockheed-funded project, this
configuration resulted primarily from flight software changes to the
basic single fail-operational, dual-dual RDFCS to obtain a double fail-
operational systems. Although some constraints were imposed, the
resulting system is quite representative of conventional quadruplex
systems. Furthermore, since it was originally developed to demonstrate a
rigorous system/software design methodology (see Reference 14), it was
especially well-suited for use in an overall assurance assessment
example.

3.0 OBJECTIVES
This quadruplex DFCSassessment investigation was intended to illustrate
a critical DFCS assurance process, with focus on airworthiness
certification topics. The investigation was largely motivated by
prospects for certification technology tutorials. The methods illustrated
were to be technically sound, pragmatically constructive, and where
possible, innovative relative to the state of practice. The methods
employed, however, are not necessarily held to be the best or the only
effective ones for critical DFCSuse.
3.1 Goal
This work is intended to provide a plausible and representative example
of how to assure the airworthiness of full-time flight-critical digital
flight systems in the near future, although addressed at a scaled-down
level, the double fail-operational quadruplex DFCS problem is
representative of near-term certification challenges, as for SASor AFBW
systems, the emphasis, however, is on the integrated use of assurance
methods, automated tools for system simulator testing, and analytical
test case definition, hopefully, the results obtained will foster a
meaningful advance in the state of certification practice, with
particular benefits accruing to the productivity and conclusiveness of
validation testing.
3.2 Specific Objectives
The overall objective of this project has been the establishment of
airworthiness technology readiness for fault-tolerant system
architectures for full-time critical functions. Aside from the
development and demonstration of the relevant technology, attainment of
this objective is crucially dependent on the dissemination of results,
both in report form and in tutorial workshops. Realization of the overall
objective, moreover, has been predicated on the following elemental
objectives:
o Quantitative analytical comparison of basic DFCSredundancy levels
relative to system reliability
o Quantitative analytical comparison of alternative quadruplex
configurations relative to system reliability
o Critique of critical AFBW mechanization in terms of fault
survivability
o System simulator demonstration' of basic quadruplex DFCS fault
survivability, in part using automated test methods.
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3.3 Scope
As noted in Section 2.4, this investigation of augmented flying qualities
was conducted without an acceptable pilot interface. This resulted from
RDFCS facility limitations and funding level realities. Also, the
quadruplex DFCS was implemented almost solely through software
modifications, so while functionally representative, certain aspects
usually implemented in hardware were rendered in software. Only pitch
axis flight control functions were incorporated in the DFC_, but these
served to illustrate the newer type critical functions. In all, a balance
was sought between available resources and realizable results, and where
project economies were necessary, this report has attempted to address
and elucidate the associated technical issues and consequences.
3.4 Expectations
Since this effort has focused primarily on system architectures, there
remains a need to explore complementary aspects of minimum safe stability
augmentation functions using pilot-in-the-loop flight simulation. The
need encompasses both methods and criteria, as well as a means to
incorporate the associated results into the overall assurance process. Of
course flight simulation entails a high fidelity flight station with
electronic displays and appropriate controllers. It is therefore
projected that this type undertaking will soon be pursued by a
multidisciplinary team in the context of commercial transport
applications.
In the farther term, as fault-tolerant architectures become more
sophisticated, the role of the system simulator is expected to be
diminished by a more general and powerful system development facility
known as a rapid prototyping environment. Such a facility places greater
emphasis on assurance activities on the front-end of the development
cycle, and subsequently propagated accountability. It is therefore
projected that such facilities and their enabling methods and tools will
evolve over the next decade to become standard type installations within
the airframe business.
I0
4.0 TASKRESULTS
With existing RDFCSconstraints in mind, a representative double fail-
operational DFCSarchitecture was defined from among a set of related
candidates. The redundancy management coordination of this design was
verified through predicate/transition network simulation, and the high-
level software design was then represented in nested control graphs. The
actual flight code was rendered in AED, beginning with an austere real-
time executive, and loaded into the Collins CAPS-6flight computers at
NASAAmes. Cross-channel coordination was effected through respective
channel control states broadcasted over corresponding serial digital
buses. The quadruplex DFCSwas then tested under various simulated fault
and anomaly conditions using real-time software execution monitors to
resolve low-level system managementevents.
RSSflight cases were installed in the PDP-II/60 flight simulation at
NASAAmes, and validated using previously defined airplane root solutions
and time history check cases. New AFBW sensor outputs were ported from
the PDP-II/60, through the MDICU,to the flight computers. Also, new mode
and fault logic signals were assigned on the logic discrete switch panel
on the simulator pallet. Lastly, the pitch-axis manual control stick
inputs were introduced into the flight computers from a hand controller.
Hence, it was possible to assess flying qualities degradation through
real-time closed-loop system simulation, with or without an operator in
the loop. Unfortunately, the manual flying qualities assessment was
hamperedby the poor quality of pilot interface available, but the
characteristics of the free or unaugmentedairplane yielded such severe
or noticeable degradation under somesensor faults that the interface was
actually of someuse.
4.1 System Definitions
System definition evolved per the development products noted in Figure 3,
which depicts mechanization increments along the downwardpath on the
left, and assurance milestones along the upward path on the right.
Further detail on the development activities are presented in Table I
within the framework of the typical stages of development. Certain of
the aforementioned development products are illustrated later in this
report. The intent here is to exemplify key steps, corresponding to pro-
gressive system definitions, that should lead to a certifiable DFCS.
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Table i.
PHASE
LONCEPTUAL
PEFtNITION
PURPOSE
"PROVIDE FOR
USER NEEDS"
"DESIGN FOR
uSER NEEDS"
INPUT
Development Phase Activities and Products
MISSION REQUIREMENTS
ANALYSIS
DESIGN
CODING
AND
CItECKOUT
NTECRA
TION
DEVELOP
qENT TEST
VALIDATION
L[RTIFICA
TH)N
"DESIGN
SYSTEM TO
SPECIFICA-
T ION"
"DESIGN
SOFTWARE TO
SPECIFICA
TION"
"IMPLEMENT
iSOFTWARE
TO SPECI-
FICATIONS"
"CONSTRUCT
SYSTEM WITH
4ARUWARE/
SOF T'_ARE
COMPONENTS"
"TEST TO
SPECIFICA
TION RE-
QUIREMENTS"
"TEST FOR
REQUIRE
MENTS
COMPLIANCE"
"DEMON
STRATE
AIRWORTH
INESS COM-
PI.I _NCE"
AIRWORTHINESS RE-
QUIREMENT_ SYSTEM
REQUIREMENTS.
SYSTEM CONCEPTS
SYSTEM SPECIFICATION
SOFTWARE
SPECIFICATION
UNIT SPECIFICATIONS
VERIFIED STRUCTURE
AND COMPONENTS
SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
PROCESS
MECHANIZATION ASSURANCE
FORMULATE SYSTEM
REQUIREMENTS
EXPLORE DESIGN
SOLUTIONS
FORMULATE SYSTEM
SPECIFICATION RE
FINE SYSTEM
CONCEPTS
DEVELOPMENT
PRODUCT SYSTEM STATUS
DESIGN SYSTEM
STRUCTURE, DESIGN
CONTROL ,LAWS
DESIGN SOFTWARE
STRUCTURE, DEFINE
;OFTWARE COMPO-
NENTS
IMPLEMENT
PROGRAM UNITS
ASSEMBLE/DEVELOP
SYSTEM
VALIDATE REQUIREMENTS
ANALYZE DESIGN
SOLUTIONS
VERIFY SPECIFICATIONS
VALIDATE SYSTEMS
CONCEPTS
VERIFY SOFTWARE
SPECIFICATION, VERIFY
SYSTEM STRUCTURE,
vERIFY CONTROL LAWS
VERIFY SOFTWARE
DESIGN. VERIFY UNIT
SPECIFICATIONS
CHECK/DE-BUG
UNITS, VERIFY
PROGRAM UNITS
IDENTIFY/RECTIFY
INCONSISTENCIES
DEVELOP SYSTEM
OPTIMIZE PERFORM-
ANCE
IDENTIFY/RECTIFY
DEFICIENCIES
VERIFY PERFORM-
ANCE
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
SYSTEM CONCEPTS
SYSTEM SPECIFICATION
CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM
DESIGN
SYSTEM DESIGN
SOFTWARE SPECIFICA-
TIONS, HARDWARE
;PECIFICATIONS
SOFTWARE DESIGN
PROGRAM UNIT
SPECIFICATIONS
SOFTWARE
IMPLEMENTATION
SYSTEM
IMPLEMENTATION
FUNCTIONAL
ARCHITECTURE
"FEASIBLE
DESIGN
SOLUTION"
VALIDATED
CONCEPTUAL
DESIGN
"ACCEPTABLE
DESIGN
SOLUTION"
VERIFIED SYSTEM
STRUCTURE
"SUPERIOR
DESIGN SOLU
TION"
VERIFIED BASE-
LINE DESIGN
"COMPREHENSIVE
r)CSIGN DEFINI =
T ION"
BASELINE SYSTEM
CONFIGURATION
"COMPREHENSIVE
SYSTEM DEFINI-
TION"
DEVELOPMENTAL
SYSTEM
MODIFY SYSTEMIF CONFIRM
NECESSARY ACCEPTABILITY
AIRWORTHINESS RE- MODIFY SYSTEM IF CONFIRM
(4UIREMENTS NECESSARY AIRWORTHINESS
CERTIFICATION PLAN
VERIFIED
IMPLEMENTATION
PROVISIONAL
CONFIGURATION
VERIFIED
SYSTEM
VALIDATED
SYSTEM
PRODUCTION
CONFIGURATION
CERTIFICATED
SYSTEM
OF
O_
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m
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Broadly, design definitions usually address either sys_:em functioil(s) o_7
architecture. The former centers on control laws, and _:he latter expands
into a detailing of system/software structuL-e. With regard to the
structure of digital mechanizations, it is particularly vital t:o
explicitly describe the organization of the flight soft_-,are. These three
aspects of system definition are discussed further in the following s_d)-
sections prior to presenting application examples. Because of ]_._;
centrality to reliable/fault-tolerant DFCSs, particu]ar emphasis is
placed on system/software architecture. Hence, the design tasks noted in
Figure 4 have been illustrated through a sequence of e,_.ample deveJopment:
stages.
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Figure 4. Architecture Design Tasks
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4.1.1 Quadruplex System Description
Most DFCSsto date have essentially been digitized versions of previous
analog mechanizations. These DFCSs have been characterized by:
conventional system architectures based upon parallel replication_
frequency domain derived control laws mappedinto difference equations;
and multirate foreground executive programs to periodically call
appropriate applications software for selected control functions. In
general, systems have been dedicated strictly to control functions,
thereby avoiding potentially debilitating software anomalies resulting
from interference by other software functions.
Parallel channels, each with virtually the same software, have only
recently yielded to dissimilar processors or software to reduce the
possibilities for coincident or generic design faults. Similarly,
floating-point arithmetic processors are beginning to replace fixed-point
processors; this change obviates the need for scaling variables, another
carry-over from analog computer practice. Higher-order programming
languages are becoming prevalent for quality and cost reasons, and Ada
will likely soon dominate software on commercial aircraft. Multiplex
(MUX)data buses are now predominant over point-to-point buses for
broader and more general usage of resources.
4.1.1.1 Pitch Augmentation Function
To pose a full-time criticality problem, a relaxed static stability
transport airplane was defined with a negative stability margin and a
fly-by-wire primary flight control system. The associated control law
depicted in Figure 5 is employed in each of four computational channels,
as indicated by the quad input voters. Pilot commandsare applied through
control stick inputs; short-period damping is provided by actual, not
derived, pitch rate; and angle-of-attack is used to control pitch-axis
divergence associated with RSS. Special signal processing includes
control stick deadbands and pilot/copilot stick blending, left/right
angle-of-attack averaging, and commandlimiting.
Becausecontrol surface effectiveness varies over the flight profile,
certain DFCSgains must do likewise. This facet of design is referred to
as gain scheduling, and true airspeed is often used to schedule control
law parameters. In this investigation, six point simulation flight cases
were employed, so Table 2 presents their associated sensor feedback
gains. Note that the gains are generally less at higher speeds because
control surface effectiveness tends to increase with speed.
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Figure 5. Augmented Fly-by-Wire Control Laws
Table 2. Stability Augmentation Gain Scheduling
FLIGHT
CASE
TRUE
AIRSPEED
(fps)
Ka
(deg./deg.) (deg /deg. per sec.)
AIRSS 283.7 1.00 0.70
CI3RSS 910.7 0.73 0.I0
CI5RSS 442.2 1.00 0.40
D2RSS 487.1 1.00 0.33
E3RSS 265.7 1.00 0.80
F6RSS 224.1 1.00 0.50
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4.1.1.2 Basic SystemArchitecture
The first DFCSarchitectures introduced were rather conventional in that
they largely reflected prior analog configurations, at least at the block
diagram level. These employed parallel, replicated channels wherein
sensors fan-in to processors, which in turn fan-out to effectors or
displays. Figure 6 presents an expansion of such an architecture for the
pitch-axis AFBW function. Except for cross-channel communication, all
signal paths are dedicated analog paths, and fan-in is minimized by
having one sensor set applied directly to each computational channel.
Each channel then broadcasts its received inputs to the other three.
Other architectural options are described and critiqued later.
The top-level primary flight control system (AFBW) requirements are
assumedto be MIL-F-9490D operational states (Reference 15). Because
these have well defined meaning that encompassesboth airplane flying
qualities and system safety in terms of redundancy margins. Operational
State 1 denotes normal system status and Level 1 or good flying
qualitiesl State 2 admits some deterioration in safety margins and Level
2 or somewhat degraded flying qualities; State 3 indicates marginal
safety margins and flying qualities (Level 3); and Stste 4 or worse
designates unsafe componentry and/or flying qualities. Knowledgeof
flying qualities degradation under successive component failures enables
the operational state logic to be viewed from strictly an architectural
point of view. The system design task then focuses on channel-level logic
definition to effectuate the system-level logic.
Figure 7 represents the top-level DFCS channel logic design, where the
nameswithin the circles correspond to particular states that associated
logic variables can assume. These variables denote ststes or sub-states
of the channel. The namesappearing on the arcs of the state transition
graphs designate independent logic events such as pilot modeselection, a
timer interrupt, or a componentfailure. Such events in turn mayeffect
changes in the channel states per se, which must reflect the state of the
system. Note that the transition graphs are nested to reduce
complexity_ the lower-level graphs, moreover, capture sub-state
information.
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In the Gate Sub-state of the Cycling State, for exailiple, each channel
develops its view of system status base(_ on control stat.._ information for
each of the four channels. This type of consensus is or;e of the major
determinants in calculating the operational state of the system. In all,
the implementation of this design obviously necessitates an appreciable
expansion of the logic in the flight cpde. First, however, it is
necessary to examine the system level coordination lo_ic meeting the
timing constraints in Table 3.
System synchronization logic with a discrete time b_se imposed is
captured in Figure 8, which is called a predicate/transition network
(Reference 2). This view represents only one channel, but all four are
the same for tile subject architecture. Here the same logic nomenclature
is retained where applicable, and some new logic varia|,les are added.
the logic names appear in the rounded boxes, which are called "places" in
the network. At any given time, the co].lect_ve values of all places
constitute the state of the system modeled. To examine and verify the
correctness of all possible state sequences, the network's operation must
be simulated using a computer program. Properly accomplished, such a
simulation, under both faulted and [ault-free condition:;, verifies the
system logic design.
RUN
I---
READY
__j RESET
Table 3. Cycling State Loop Timing
GLOBAl_
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FALSE
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TRUE
BACKG ROUND
TRUE
GATE
FALSE
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The simulation is based on the firing of "transitions," a_, (k_1_oted by
rectangles, which yield new values for the logic variablL, s stored in the
places. The top half of each transition box describes a p_edicate whose
satisfaction by system logic values enables it to be fired. 1_Z_enever a
transition fires, the new logic values described in the bottom half of
the rectangle are assigned, these values are then reflected in the
appropriate places, and a new network state produces a new set of
transition that can be fired.
This mechanism can be seen more clearly by noting the partial network in
Figure 9. Here the network captures a design whereit_ the hardware
initialization within a channel sets its POWER ON to True and its CLEAR
to False. This arms the top transition, whose firing corresponds to
INITIAL ACIIVATION
POWER_ON• TRUE
CLEAR - FALSE
<ENABLE1
,i
CLEAR" ENABLE"
GO_2"GO_]'GO_4"
RECOVER
ENABLE • TRUE
CLOCK S - RUN
GAIEPATH • !
IPOV_ER-ON1
, f
POWER ON'
CLEAR
-(]LEAR • TRUE
SET ICs
cLEA 
ICLEAR'ENABLE"(GO_2 4 GO3 * GO_4)
"RECOVER
RECOVER • TRUE
SYNCH_TO " I(GO)
SET IC_
ENABLe":FALSE
GATEPAIII.I - 0
GO_l, FALSE
RECOV!R •FALSE
RUN_I • FALSE
. 2,3,4 y
J
Figure 9. Predicate/Transition Network Detail
22
software initialization that sets CLEAR to True among other logic
variable assignments shown. Referring to Figure 9, note that the event
of CLEAR be set to True effects the top-level channel state transition
from DOWN to ADAPTING. At this point, the channel tries to synchronize
with the other channels, to enter the CYCLING state.
Network simulation should always yield acceptable system states, and
should never terminate unless all channels are failed. Determining that
this is the case is a matter of defining and obtaining correct logic
operation. In the subject investigation, this was accomplished with one
exception noted later. Figure I0 illustrates some typical discrete-event
simulation results for four-way channel synchronization. The pulses at
the top indicate instances wherein individual channels were forced out of
synchronization, i.e., the corresponding logic variable RECOVER went
True. The re-synchronization logic in the network model then
satisfactorily restored synchronization, and the RECOVER was set to False
as indicated by the end of the pulse in Figure i0.
Following synchronization design verification which captured time-based
hardware/software interaction, the design emphasis shifted to the top-
level software design with the constraints imposed by the existing RDFCS
hardware.
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Figure I0. Predicate/Transition Network Simul_tion Output
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4.1.1.3 Executive Flight Software Organization
As with the basic Collins system, the flight software is hardware
interrupt-driven at the given 60 Hz rate. Since the AFBW control laws
were designed for 20 Hz operation, the executive software invokes the
applications control functions every third interrupt. The executive
program itself is rather austere, as appropriate for a dedicated system.
Here the computational channels mutually coordinate themselves in a frame
synchronous, double fail-operational manner.
To achieve this, the channel design described in the previous section
must be mapped into a software design with objectives of" maintaining
consistency in the system-to-software design transition; and minimizing
the complexity of the software. Accordingly, the control graph in Figure
ii represents a mapping of the top-level transition graph in Figure 7 to
a software control structure that preserves the design logic in a form
exhibiting only moderate decision logic complexity per the cyclomatie
number (see Reference 16). As by-products, the control graph yields test
case input vectors and logic assertions that were later used in verifying
the implemented code.
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4.2 Reliability Assessment
Reliability assessments were directed toward contrasting levels and types
of redundancy relative to their impact on system reliability for critical
functions. Table 4 delineates 12 different system architectures that
were analyzed for critical system function failure on both five- and ten-
hour missions. The system architecture in Figure 6 actually corresponds
to Cases I and 2 in Table 4, depending upon whether inherent back-up
capability is invokable. Because of the mode selection switch
arrangement devised in the RDFCS laboratory, the back-up mode was
manually selectable. Hence, Figure 12 represents the reliability model
for Architecture Case i, the one actually implemented. Note that the
dependencies and logic embedded in this reliability model do not,
however, apply to Case 2.
Cases i through 5 are all-up AFBW architectures, which are the primary
concern here. Cases I through 3 meet the critical function reliability
requirements of Reference i, but the analyses only take into account
hardware fault contributions
instructive in several ways.
offers surprisingly little to
needed so infrequently, and
unavailable due to the loss
SAS.
to unreliability. Still, the data are
Basically, the back-up pitch hold mode
survivability, partly because it would be
at a time when it too might well be
of common components with the basic pitch
Cases 4 and 5 are inadequate because of reduced redundancy levels. Cases
5 through 7 isolate the reliability properties of straight FBW
architectures. A contrast of Cases 2 and 6, for example, discloses that
the critical pitch SAS function increases the probability of failure by
about only a third for straight FBW. the straight SAS function is
isolated in Cases 9 through 12, and it is noteworthy that triplex AOAs
and computers are inadequate per Case 12. Triplex servos, with
quadruplex sensors are, however, satisfactory.
Tables 5 and 6 reveal flying qualities degradation as well as system
failure, because the extent and likelihood of degradation are important
measures of system acceptability. Cases 6 through 8 have been omitted
because the straight FBW function does not degrade in stages_ it in
general fails completely when an appropriate combination of failures have
occurred. Since stability augmentation degradation is basically sensor
related, this set of servo-oriented architecture variations are not fully
useful in delineating flying qualities trade-offs.
Certain factors, however, are rather interesting. Cases Ii and 12 show
only a modest increase in flying qualities degradation for the fully
triplex architecture, but notable disposition toward system failure.
This suggests that the triplex computers are a weaker point in the
configuration 12 than the three AOA pairs. Case 8 in Table 4 tends to
reinforce this inference.
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Table 4, DFCSReliability Assessments
_o
CO
CASE
i
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
i0
ii
12
SYSTEM
Quad AFBW
Quad AFBW
Quad AFBW
Quad AFBW
Dual-Dual AFBW
Quad FBW
Quad FBW
Triplex FBW
Quad SAS
Quad SAS
Quad SAS
Triplex SAS
SAS BACK-UP
Pitch Hold
None
None
None
None
N/A
N/A
N/A
Pitch Hold
None
None
None
SERVO SET-UP
Quad
Quad
Triplex
Dual-Dual
Dual-Dual
Quad
Triplex
Triplex
Quad
Quad
Triplex
Triplex
I
5 -HR
SYSTEM FAILURE
.478 x i0 exp -I0
.615 x I0 exp -i0
.626 x i0 exp -i0
.107 x i0 exp -7
.200 x I0 exp -6
.457 x I0 exp -i0
.468 x I0 exp -I0
.153 x I0 exp -6
.478 x I0 exp -I0
.615 x i0 ex -I0
.626 x i0 exp -i0
.188 x I0 exp -6
10-HR
.382 x I0 exp -9
.492 x I0 exp -9
.500 x I0 exp -9
.430 x i0 exp -7
.798 x i0 exp -6
.365 x i0 exp -9
.374 x i0 exp -9
.612 x i0 exp -6
.382 x i0 exp -9
.491 x i0 exp -9
.500 x I0 exp -0
./hi x iu exp -6
\\, , I1._
\\ ,¢_,_OF//./. co,',_OT
\\\\ i l,"l
\\\V,/,,'/
DASttED LINES WITH ARROWS INDICATE
UNIDIRECTIONAL DEPENDENCIES
FAILURE RATES GIVEN IN fAILURES PER /VILLION FLYING HOURS
BUS AND CONNECTOR FAILURES INCLUDED
2,
3.
Figure ]2. DFCS Re]Jabi].ity Block PJagr_,m
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Tob]e 5. }'i",it_g Que]itJes: Degrodeti_,i: ft,r a 5-Uour YissJoi
CD
CASE
1
2
3
4
5
9
10
11
12
PROBABILITY OF FLYING QUALITIES LEVEL
3 Less than 3
.999+
.999+
.999+
.999+
.999+
.999+
.999_
.99q_
.999+
212 x 10 exp -6
212 >" 10 exp -6
21'o! x !0 exp -6
2!2 :: 10 exp -6
120 x !0 exit -3
?12 x 10 exp -6
712 x 10 exl> -3
?12 x tO exp -6
X':_lx 10 exp -_)
.017 x 10 exp -11
0
0
0
0
• 137 x 10 exp -lO
0
0
0
.478 x I0 exp -I0
615 x i0 exp -i0
626 x I0 exp -I0
607 x 10 exp -I0
200 x 10 exp -6
478 x i0 exp -I0
615 x 10 exp -10
626 x 10 exp -10
188 x 10 exp -6
_DI"
t'" f_
-<5;
Table 6. Flying Qualities Degradation for a 10-Hour Mission
L_
CASE
I
2
3
4
5
9
i0
II
12
PROBABILITY OF FLYING QUALITIES LEVEL
3
.999+
.848 x i0 exp -6 .250 x i0 exp -14
.999+
.999+
.999+
.999+
.999+
.999+
.999+
.999+
.848 x i0 exp -6
.848 x i0 exp -6
.848 x i0 exp -6
.240 x I0 exp -3
.819 x I0 exp -6
.848 x i0 exp -6
.848 x I0 exp -6
.883 x I0 exp -6
0
0
0
0
.108 x I0 exp -9
0
0
0
Less than 3
.382 x i0 exp -9
.492 x i0 exp -9
.500 x I0 exp -9
.430 x I0 exp -7
.798 x i0 exp -6
.382 x I0 exp -9
.492 x i0 exp -9
.500 x i0 exp -9
.751 x i0 exp -6
4.2.1 Additional Quadruplex Architectural Variations
The foregoing architecture constitutes an older vintage of DFCSsuch as
those retrofitted on an airplane originally wired for analog systems;
this was a constraint imposed by the RDFCSarchitecture, which was
similar to the L-lOll DFCS. In retrofit typ_ situations, system
interconnect wiring is usually dedicated point-to-poil:t signa] paths,
with little use of digital MUX buses. Currently, parall{] MUXbuses are
in common use, and considerably more complex buses topologies are
expected for future system. Specifically, bandwidth, d_.magetolerance,
and system integration are likely to motivate more divesity amongMUXbus
organizations.
4.3 Relaxed Static Stability Airplane
A negative static stability margin was postulated as a requirement for
this investigation, and the existing flight cases for the NASAAmesRDFCS
simulation (Reference 17) were altered to yield six RSSf..ight cases. The
resultant RSSflight cases were then analyzed to determin_ the pitch axis
dynamic behavior, and a non-realtime simulation was develc_pedand checked
against the predicted pitch-axis dynamics for the fre,_ or unaugmented
airplane. The sameflight case data were then used in th,{ RDFCSfacility
simulation. Next, the non-realtime simulation time histor _, responses were
used to check the RDFCSsimulation.
4.3.1 Airplane Simulations
Both the non-realtime and the RDFCSsimulations were imp_ementedusing a
state variable approach as depicted in Figure 13. Her_ the pitch-axis
dynamics of the free RSSairplane, as captured in the mat_'ix A, are quite
divergent or unstable, so certain states must be fed },ack to enable a
stability augmentation function. The state variables here are pitch,
pitch rate, vertical axis velocity, and horizontal axis velocity. The
first two states are inertially oriented, and are dire_tly measuredby
airplane sensors. The second two are referenced to the airstream incident
on the airplane, and are combined to form the directly measuredsignals,
angle-of-attack and true airspeed. These tQo air data signals are
produced using matrix C.
The above sensor feedback signals then appear in vector u, and the
pilots' stick inputs are applied through vector d in Fig,_re 13. No outer
loop sensors as for autoland were used in this investigation, although
they were included in the RDFCSsimulation.
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Figure 13. Airplane Simulation Block Diagram
4.3.1.1 Flight Cases
Table 7 summarizes conversions of six existing basic wide-b(,dy transport
type flight cases to six corresponding RSS flight cases wi_h -5% static
stability margins. For Flight Case AIRSS for example, calculations
revealed the neutral point to be at 53% of the mean aeroc_ynamic chord
(MAC), where neutrality denotes no pitch moment change with a change in
angle-of-attack. More specifically, the stability derivative describing
the airframe behavior goes to zero. The -5% static margin then
corresponds to shifting the center-of-gravity aft to 58% MAC.
This type of alteration to the airframe dynamics yields a pair of real or
non-oscillatory roots, "Tau i" and "Tau 2" in Table 7. Note that the
negative time constants for Tau 2 correspond to positive roots, which
plot on the positive axis of the s-plane, produce an absolut_ instability
or exponential divergence that dominates the dynamic re_ponse of the
airplane's pitch-axis. With a negative 5% margin, moreover_ the rate of
divergence is rather rapid, and this is clearly unacceptable For Flight
Case F6RSS, for example, the 3.17 second time constant yields a doubling
of pitch attitude in 2.2 seconds, which is quite rapid and uuflyable.
Such a tendency must be overcome by a stability augmenta_zion function
whose closed-loop eigenvalues rectify these kinds of dynamic responses.
Note that instability per se is not necessarily unacceptable for four of
the basic flight cases exhibit a negatively damped phugoid. In all
cases, however, the negative damping is quite small and the phugoid
period is relatively long.
4.3,1.2 Simulation Organization
A non-realtime simulation was used to generate airplane time history
check cases prior to work at the RDFCS simulator. The organization of
the airplane simulation was actually the same as that of the one which
had previously been installed in the PDP-II/60 at NASA Ames. For the RSS
flight cases, no changes were made to the software organization itself,
however, other than to add interfaces for the SAS control laws.
Basically, the organization of the simulation provides for the conversion
of flight case data into a discrete-time model, trimming for specified
initial conditions, and the generation of dynamic time history outputs.
Ground effects, random gust options, or point simulation flight case
transitions may be selected.
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Table 7. Relaxed Static Stabi].ity Flight Cases
to
<on
Ot_
e
:_._oH_
L_S E
C ENTER
0 F
SRAVITY
% c
A!RSS 58.0
CI5RSS
D2RSS
E3RSS
F6RSS
51.0
54.2
52.8
NEUTRAL
POINT
_%
VT T 1 T 2 60 PH
fps sec see red/see
AC M
_PH A6H
53.0 283.7 1.099 -5.86 0.169 0.276
46.0 910.7 0.160 -2.40 0.008 0.325
49.2 442.2 0.122 -1.64 0.134 0.526
47.8 487.1 0.660 -7.55 0.125 0.453
47.8 265.7 0.938 -7.09 0.167 0.488
49.4 224.1 0.920 -3.17 0.209 0.192
&C M
Aq
1/r:!di/rad
-3.247 -II.A8
-2.830 -14. _
kC M
A&
_c/rad
{
-2.415!-12.[5
-2.533 i-12.75
t
-3.138 }-ii.76
-3.016[-Ii.23
l
-3.14
-7.83
-3.03
0.050
0.044
I __
! !/rad
i 0. 295
i O. 353
0.288
I
-3.44 0.053
-3.18 0.050 i 0.292
-3.14 0.053 0.306
0.960
4.3.2 Flight Case Analyses
Twostages of analysis were performed. First, the RSSairplane behavior
was approximated by aft shifting of the center-of-gravity to -5%MAC.
Note that six old flight cases have been converted intc_ six derivatives
sensitive to the reduced lever arm of the empennageabo_t the new center
of gravity ere appropriately changed. As indicated in T_bie 7, these all
relate to the generation of pitching moment. The analysis of the RSS
flight cases then involved the examination of their respective dynamics.
Specifically, the RSS stability derivatives ere used to calculate the
free airplane response by finding the root sc.lutions to the
characteristic equation for each flight case. These results also are
given in Table 7.
Basically, defining a RSS flight case involves finding the neutral point
center-of-gravity, i.e., the point at which no pitching moment results
from a lift change on the wing. This point, in terms c_f percent of the
mean aerodynamic chord (MAC), is therefore found to be 53% for Flight
Case AIRSS. Since a -5% stability margin is desire(_, the center-of-
gravity for Flight AIRSS 58%. The shortened lever arm from the horizontal
stabilizer to the center-of-gravity produces a proportionate reduction in
moment generating capability, as evident in certain of the RSS stability
derivatives given in Table 7.
Note that the sign on pitching moment due to wing _ift changes from
"minus" for 25% to "plus" for 58%. In the RSS case then_ increasing lift
produces more nose up moment, which in turn increases lift further. This
positive feedback effect constitutes unconditional instability in the
free or unaugmented airplane response. The rate of di_ergence is quite
rapid. For Flight Case F6RSS, for example, the time constant of -3.17
seconds yields a doubling of pitch attitude every 2.2 se_:onds. The given
time constants, radial frequencies, and damping ratios were obtained from
the root solutions of the characteristic equations for the respective
flight cases, as determined by the stability derivatives
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4.3.2.1 Simulation Check Cases
Simulation check cases were first run using the non-realtime dynamic
simulation. Time histories were generated for each case, and checked
against the root solutions. For the RSS cases, the divergent real root
dominated the time histories. Hence, the pitch angle sequence exhibits
an exponential time constant roughly the same as the analytical
calculated time constant value of -3.17 seconds for Flight Case F6RSS
once the initial transient has subsided. The initial upset employed here
of 3.0 degrees/second of pitch rate is not really needed to exhibit the
instability. Rather, it is used as a standard upset as needed for the
corresponding augmentedairplane.
While these free airplane responses are used as a cross-check on the
real-time airplane simulation, the augmentedairplane response is used to
check both the simulation and the stability augmentation control laws.
Analytical root solution (eigenvalue) checks can also be madefor the
augmentedairplane response, wherein the order of the characteristic
equations is increased due to the presence of the sensors feedbacks. All
these checks should be in general agreement, and they serve to
corroborate the control law done in different stages of development.
4.3.2.2 Stability Augmentation Requirements
In general, the requirements for stability augmentation are to effect
desirable flying qualities for the augmented airplane. Basically, the
eigenvalues of the closed-loop airplane should exhibit suitable damping
and frequency characteristics. In effect, the augmentation control law
should override the RSS airplane's positive pitching moment due to
increasing wing lift. Restoration of the negative pitching momentis
possible through a nose-down stabilizer input for increasing angle-of-
attack.
For the subject demonstration, the design criteria was simply to provide
approximately the same, or better, pitch axis handling and response for
the stability augmentedRSS augmented airplane as was available on the
basic 254 MACcenter-of-gravity free airplane.
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4.4 RDFCSFacility Modifications
Because of the scope and complexity of the RDFCSsimulator_ ti_e changes
to the facility were rather extensive. Converting a single fail-
operational system to a double fail-operational one is clearly non-
trivial, and altogether the details handled were quite appreciable. The
DFCSsoftware, the airplane simulation, and the system inter:onnection
were re-worked. Then the test software to evaluate the AFBWsfstem were
developed. With respect to Figure 14, software changes or additions were
madeto the FCCs, the MDICU, and the PDP-II/04. Somenew pin a{signments
were madefor the back connector breakout panel pins, and several new
switch functions were designated at the logic discrete panel.
4.4.1 Pitch-Axis AugmentedFly-by-Wire System
Basically, an essentially new DFCS flight software load modulewas
developed. A double fail-operational system architecture was i_plemented
with computational frame synchronization across the four channels.
Channel coordination was accomplished using control variables b[oadcasted
by each channel over existing serial digital buses. This involved new
absolute address assignments during software linking. As a result, the
AFBWwas implemented without any hardware modifications to the flight
computers. Because of the relatively s]ow refresh rat_ of the
asynchronous digital buses, the frame synchronization process was much
slower than customary. But the effect on system operatio_l was not
consequential.
4.4,1.I Stability Augmentation Control Laws
The control laws were implemented using the customary Tustin transform,
with variable scaling to unity. The details for any one chan,_el appear
in Figure 15. Only the pilot's stick was connected, so there was no
stick blending logic. The voter/comparator thresholds are given in Table8.
4,4.1.2 AugmentedAirplane Check Cases
The dynamic response of Flight Case F6RSSfor the free airplane simulated
in the PDP-II/60 is presented in Figure 16. An initial pitch rate upset
is introduced, and the ensuing pitch axis divergence was found to conform
to the non-realtime check case time history. Noting the trace for pitch
attitude excursions about trim, a time constant of about 3.0 seconds can
be observed over seven one-second intervals averaged betwe.en1 and 8
seconds. This compareswith the computedpositive real root in 'Fable 6 of
3.17 seconds. All six RSS flight cases were checked out in this same
manner, comparing time histories and calculating response t_me constants.
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Table 8. Sensor Comparator Thresholds
MONITORED
SIGNAL
COMPARATOR
AMPLITUDE THRESHOLD TIME DELAY
VALIDITY FLAG
TRIP DELAY HEALING DELAY
Angle-of-Attack 1.0 degrees 250 ms 1 0 sec 2 0 sec
Pilots' Stick Inputs 5% full stick 200 ms N/A N/A
Pitch Rate 0.5 deg/sec 400 ms 250 ms i 0 sec
Stabilizer Command 0.i degrees i00 ms i00 ms i00 ms
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4.4.2 Augmented Fly-by-Wire Modifications
Simulated interconnect wiring changes are noted in Tables 9 and I0.
Sheet I of Table 9 summarizes how the simulation output was modified to
provide the sensor signals needed for the SAS function. Sheet 2 shows
how these signals were directed through the MDICU and into the FCCs. In
all, three software programs had to be altered to effectuate these
changes. Table 9 summarizes the discrete logic input signals and their
routing into the FCCs. Note that FCC memory locations were chosen to be
the same in each computer channel so that the software in each channel
would be as well.
Figure 17 indicates the top-level software flow in the FCCs. This
encompasses and implements the previously verified software design. Note
that several levels of control logic appear in a flow chart form here,
but there remains a one-to-one correspondence with the design. The
flight control laws were calculated in the Foreground segment.
The closed-loop stability augmentation short-period response for Flight
Case F6RSS is shown in Figure 18. The initial pitch rate is rather
quickly damped out with only a small second overshoot. The augmentation
command produces a smooth horizontal stabilizer input that vanishes in 5
seconds. The phugoid for the augmented airplane is not evident in the
brief time history, but there are no indications of significant looseness
or divergence. Obviously, the flying qualities of the augmented airplane
here are quite good, and in the case of the other RSS flight cases as
well. This caliber of pitch axis response then serves as the reference to
which flying qualities degradation is assessed during sensor failure
effects testing.
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Table 9. Analog Signal Reassignmen.ts (Sheet 1 of 2)
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4.5 Simulator Investigations
The investigations performed on the AFBW system included: system-level
failure effects testing that focused on flying qualities degradation; and
real-time, multilevel assessment of software behavior that focused on
architectural fault tolerance. The former type testing was rather
conventional, and as noted earlier, impeded by a low-fidelity pilot
interface. The latter was rather sophisticated, and is thought to
constitute a valuable new testing methodology for system simulators.
4.5.1 Investigation Test Plan
The test plan focused on demonstrating multilevel testing as a means of
obtaining higher confidence in the airworthiness of a DFCS. Table l0
indicates five levels of testing undertaken. The top level is
conventional system or functional testing, as required here to examine
RSS flying qualities. Four specific levels of the control structure were
explored coincidentally. These were related to prior development
activities as depicted in Figure 19. To accomplish this, there was
appreciable emphasis on automated testing and wideband instrumentation.
In all, these thrusts were seen as vital new ways of utilizing "ironbird"
system simulators.
I TYPE OFIESTING
SY STEM
VALIDATION
SY SITM
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Table ii. DFCS Testing Scenario
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Figure 19. Multilevel Testing Closure
4.5.2 Test Execution Monitor
Two test execution monitors were developed and demonstrated during the
AFBWinvestigations. The scenario employed is represented in Figure 20.
The successful use of these real-time execution monitors was a major
accomplishment of this investigation. System state logic was observed by
an execution monitor in the PDP-II/60, via an instrumentation link
through the PDP-II/04. The execution monitor was basically a finite-state
machine that was driven in parallel with the DFCSsoftware by the same
logic inputs. The monitor checked to see that the DFCSsoftware and the
PDP-II/60 software remained in accord with the design specified state of
the system.
The second execution monitor resided in one of the flight computers
because of PDP-II/04 instrumentation bandwidth limitations. This monitor
focused on the three-way channel synchronization process, under the
assumption of the prior loss of the fourth processor. Specifically, the
synchronization control signals for the other three channels were
observed and comparedwith the nested state transition graphs of Figure
7. Note that this same form of test criteria was applicable to the
predicate/transition network simulation described previously. This
precise meansof propagating accountability and ensuring consistency is
considered a superior and quite practical way of fostering a quality
DFCS.
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Figure 20. Automated Testing Scheme
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4.5.3 Simulator Testing
Actual testing of the quadruplex DFCSincluded checkout, development, and
demonstration tasks. System failure effects testing focused largely on
flight computer failure to validate architectural fault tolerance, and
sensor failure effects to validate graceful degradation of flying
qualities. The conduct of multichannel synchronizaticn was captured
primarily in the time history form shown in Figure 21, and on a more
detailed level, by the real-time execution monitors.
Eachpulse in Figure 21 corresponds to a 50 millisecond computational
frame, and the pulse amplitude denotes which of four foreground executive
program control paths is being traversed. Here cross-c_annel frame and
path synchronization is being maintained. Faults or transient disruptions
were simulated by halting a processor at its CAPStest adapter panel, or
by interrupting electrical power at the circuit breaker. Flying qualities
degradation was observed by upon simulating multiple sens_orfaults for a
given type of sensor, pitch rate or angle-of-attack. Sensors faults were
applied through the MDICUor at the back connector breako_t panel.
4.5.3.1 Synchronization Failure Effects
Figure 22 shows the slowed-down initial synchronization of three DFCS
channels. At the outset, only Channel 3 is cycling ill the foreground
mode. Channel 2 then synchronizes, followed by Channel i. Here Channel 4
is being used to run a real-time execution monitor, so it cannot comeon
line. Other exercises involved drop-out and re-synchronization as
individual computer channels were halted and released. Re-synchronization
always occurred within two cycles.
By chance, an actual clock tolerance problem occurred in c.neDFCSchannel
during the early stages of testing, thereby c_using frequent
synchronization drop-out of the affected channel. At first, a DFCS
software flaw was suspected, but it was eventually determined that the
hardware was at fault. The re-synchronization software, moreover, was
responding promptly and correctly.
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During subsequent multiple computer channels shutdown/re-start testing, a
re-synchronization discrepancy was noted. Specifically, the logic for
getting two synchronized pairs on different foreground executive paths
was found to be inadequate. Basically, each pair remained synchronized,
but the two pairs would not synchronize with each other. Representing the
same conditions in the predicate/transition network simulation revealed
the same problem, so the design had been incompletely defined, and the
design verification test cases had failed to discern this. Probably, a
design verification test case walkthrough would have strengthened the
simulation testing so as to reveal the problem early-on. Nonetheless_ it
was gratifying and instructive to note that the design verification
simulation had the inherent modeling power to characterize and resolve
the problem seen in system simulation.
4.5.3.2 Sensor Failure Effects
In Figure 23, pitch rate sensors faults have been simulated to to remove
their contribution from the stability augmentation stabilizer command.
With the same initial pitch rate as used in Figure 16, the pitch-axis
short-period response is seen to be somewhat degraded. The amplitude
stabilizer input is noticeably less in Figure 23 than in Figure 17, but
the persistence in the former case is more extended. The result a less
damped, more sluggish response that constitutes the flying qualities
degradation for the multiple pitch rate fault case. Still, the flying
qualities are not unsafe. Further analysis, and probably pilot-in-the-
loop simulation would be needed to determine the extent of the
degradation. Also, the full set of relevant RSS flight cases would have
to be so evaluated to identify the worst case pitch rate sensor fault
situation.
Loss of all angle-of-attack sensor
history response in Figure 24. The
very much worse than that shown in
the early stages of development and
feedback is represented in the time
flying qualities degradation here is
Figure 23, as had been recognized in
in the reliability analysis. Still,
Figure 24 reveals some degree of benefit resulting from the pitch rate
feedback as contrasted with the free airplane response in Figure 16. The
horizontal stabilizer corrections in Figure 24 are attributable to pitch
rate feedback, but the pitch attitude divergence nonetheless occurs,
albeit at a more controlled rate than in Figure 16_ Although pilot-in-
the-loop assessment was not possible, the degree of flying qualities
degradation here is deemed to be unacceptable and unsafe regarding the
difficulty of manually flying such an airplane.
Note that the autopilot attitude hold mode provides a back-up capability
for managing the pitch axis divergence, but the problem then is the
inconvenience in maneuvering the airplane as desired. A pitch command
knob or a pitch-axis control wheel steering input might be used, but this
may not be very acceptable for extended flight. In su_'h a situation_ the
assessment of safety and flying qualities must be carefully performed on
a special case bases, where the system fault management strategy and
operational procedures have been incorporated into the overall DFCS
design. The same basic assessment approach, however, is still employed,
namely that of a phased, integrated assurance methodology.
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS
Although the thrust of this effort was directed more toward the
adaptation and demonstration of assurance methods in a subsetted
development process, certain findings did result. The following general
conclusions were derived or confirmed through the work desclibed in this
report:
o Digitally mechanized flight control systems are significantly more
complex and difficult to validate than comparable analog systems
o An integrated, assurance-driven development methodology is
particularly vital for fault-tolerant DFCS architectures
o Resultantly improved system/software structure greatly reduces the
subject complexity, thereby facilitating validation
o Good structure also eases the impact of development changes, and
reduces the number of validation test cases
o Automated multilevel testing can be effectively and beneficially
performed in system simulators with modest additions
o Wideband software instrumentation and real-time test execution
monitors are especially valuable additions for system simulator
testing of critical DFCSs
o Use of the same execution monitor test cases and criteria for
early-on analytical simulation and for all-up system simulation
greatly extends confidence in the assurance process
o Multilevel test cases and criteria recapitulate and ultimately
confirm the overall development process.
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